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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PAUL RUBEY and
CAROL RUBEY, his wife
Plaintiffs and Respondents
vs.
~!ORRIS T. WOOD and
RUBY J. WOOD, his wife
Defendants and Appellants

Case No.
9833
Case No.
10001

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
Appeal from Judgment of Third District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, Utah
Hon. Aldon J. Anderson

STATEMEN'f OF POINTS
I. That the court erred in not construing the agreements herein strictly against the respondents who prepared the contracts.
2. That the trial court erred in refusing the appel-

lants' Motion to Dismiss herein on the ground that the
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payments had not been made nor tendered on the contract as required by the contract nor within the 90-day
grace period.
3. The District Court erred in not granting nor
taking further testimony or evidence with respect to the
following matters:

(a) To determine the intention of the parties as
to performance of the contracts.
(b) To settle disputed questions of fact.
(c) To make a finding as to the time eac,h annual
installment was to be paid.
(d) To determine the intention of the parties with
respect to title insurance and surveys.
4. That the trial court erred in refusing to allow

evidence and testimony concerning the intention of the
parties as to the use of the words, "or more," in the said
contracts and in making a finding and decree as to the
language as a rna tter of law.
5. That the District Court erred in refusing to permit a jury trial with respect to further hearings or
evidence concerning disputed facts and intention of the
parties, and this error was in violation of the Seventh
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
6. The trial court erred in denying appellants'

contention that the appellants be allowed interest at
the legal rate on the contract balances.
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7. That the District Court erred in dismissing Civil
Case No. 139263 after it was consolidated and without
the appellants being given their statutory right to
amendment. That the court also erred in denying the
consolidation of Civil Case Nos. 124832, 139046 and
139263.
8. That the court erred in directing the clerk of the
court to make and deliver a Warranty Deed to the
respondents and as set out in the Decree of November
28, 1962.
9. That it was error for the clerk to pay attorney's

fees and costs of the deposit that had been made to the
clerk of the court.
10. It was error for the Court to grant attorneys'

fees to respondents based on the account of their attorneys.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has previously heard and ruled on the validity of the contracts
in this matter under Case No. 9447. The briefs submitted
in that matter and the decision therein are respectfully
referred to in explanation of the background in this
matter.
No additional testimony has been taken before
the District Court at Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
and the rulings and judgments herein appealed from
were made by the District Court as a matter of law
and after hearing arguments by counsel.
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The District Court has entered two different judgments herein, both of which are appealed from by this
joint appeal. Said judgments directed performance of
the agreements between the parties pursuant to respondents' theory of the case. First of said judgments was
entered November 28, 1962, and appellants objection
thereto was denied December 18, 1962. Appeal is taken
from both of these rulings.
While this appeal was pending, it became apparent
that there was a good possibility of a number of appeals
as this contract covered a twenty-year period. Parties
.as a joint effort to save time and limit appeals, agreed
to the appointment of a referee by the District CoJ.ITt.
This was done, a report was rendered by the referee
and the court at a later date entered a Judgment and
Decree confirming and adopting the referee's report.
Appeal is taken from the judgment entered and overruling of appellants' objections to said judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The contracts herein involved were entered into
between appellants and respondents on April 18, 1959
and May 11, 1959, and copies of said agreements are
set out in appellants' brief in Case No. 9447 of this
court.

''T

Mr. and Mrs.
ood haYe had little experience in
legal transactions and were inexperienced and naive in
such matters (see R-105-108 original record first
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appeal) while Paul Rubey has been engaged in the sale
and handling of real estate in Salt Lake County for
about 10 years (see R-148-153 original record).
The original and first judgment rendered by the
District Court in this matter pertained merely to upholding the contract and not vitiating it for fraud as
claimed. The Supreme Court of Utah sustained this
judgment (see decree in Case No. 9447 filed July 20,
1962) and so while the contract was sustained, the
interpretation and performance of the contracts in question had not been decided or ruled upon by the first
appeal in this matter. This matter is now before the
Supreme Court of Utah on the interpretation and performance under the contracts between these parties.

ARGUMENT
I. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN NOT
CONSTRUING THE AGREEMENTS HEREIN STRICTLY AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS, WHO PREPARED THE CONTRACTS.

The cardinal rule is well expressed in 12 Am. J ur.
795, Sec. 252, as follows:
"Doubtful language in contracts should be
interpreted most strongly against the party who
uses it. A written agreement should, in case of
doubt be interpreted against the party who has
drawn it."

7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Application of this doctrine has only recently been
applied by the Supreme Court of Utah in Vera M.
Stout vs. Washington Fire and Marine Insurance Co.,
decided October 11, 1963 - found at 385 Pac. 2nd
608 -the Supreme Court said:
"Any doubts or uncertainties as to the meaning or effect of the policy must be construed so
as to resolve said doubts or uncertainties against
the defendant who prepared the contract."
In the current case, Rubey typed up the one contract and prepared the other in his own handwriting.
His background and experience are so evidenced in the
language used.
Instead of following this rule, the District Court
ruled in favor of respondents in almost every instance
as to these contracts.
2. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN REFUSING THE APPELLANTS' :\lOTION TO DISl\IISS ' HEREIN ON THE
GROUND THAT THE PAYMENTS HAD
NOT BEEN MADE OR TENDERED ON
THE CONTRACT AS REQUIRED BY THE
CONTRACT NOR \YITHIN THE 90-DAY
GRACE PERIOD.
Based upon the recognized rule that a contract
should be construed strictly against the one who prepared it, the 90-day grace period in this agreement
should be so construed and when payment was not
made nor tendered in the grace period, the contract was
8
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breached, and therefore the District Court should have
so ruled. Such a ruling, of course, would negate the contract and render it unenforceable so far as the respondents are concerned because of the breach.
If payments are required to be made In installn1ents, then failure to make payment of any installment
or within any grace period, is a breach of contract. The
rule is set out in American Jurisprudence, Volume 55,
at page 1014: " * * * and if payment is to be made in
installments, default in the payment of any installment
is a distinct breach and gives the vendor the right to
declare a forfeiture therefor."
The case of Reddish vs. Smith is cited above and
in that decision the court states: "The rule is laid down
by 2 W arv 'rend pp. 835, 836: "A neglect or refusal
of either party to perform on his part will, as a rule,
place him in the power of the other party, where he
is not only derelict, to a void the contract or note, at
his pleasure." See Reddish vs. Smith, 10 Wash 178,
38 Pac. 1003.
In Sherman vs. Western Construction Co., Inc.,
the court referred to the above case and said: "The general rule is stated in 17 C.J.S., 932, as follows: Where
the covenants or promises in a contract are dependent,
only one who has performed, or tendered performance
on his part, can enforce the contract." (See Sherman
vs. 'Vestern Constructon Co., Inc., a Washington case
cited at 127 Pac. 2nd 673). (Italics ours).

9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN
NOT GRANTING NOR TAKING FURTHER
TESTIMONY OR EVIDENCE IN THIS
MATTER AND WITH RESPECT TO THE
FOLLOWING MATTERS:

(a) TO DETERMINE THE INTENTION

OF THE PARTIES AS TO PERFORMANCE
OF THE CONTRACTS.
(b) TO SETTLE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
OF FACT.
(c) TO MAKE A :FINDING AS TO TilE

TIME EACH ANNUAL
WAS TO BE PAID.

INSTALLMENT

(d) TO DETERMINE THE INTENTION
OF THE PARTIES \VITH RESPECT TO
TITLE INSURANCE AND SURVEYS.
With respect to the above points, we respectfully
refer to the general statement as set out in 55 Am.
Jur. Sec. 97, as follows:
"The cardinal principle in the interpretation
of contracts, including offers, options and contracts for the sale of land, is to ascertain the intention of the parties and give effect thereto if
it can be collected from the instrument and the
circumstances without violating some settled
legal principle. The intent of the parties thus
expressed is to be carried into effect so far as
consistent with rules of law. 'Vords are to be
construed in the manner in which the parties
understood them; resort is to be had to every
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clause and word in the instrument for the purpose of ascertaining that understanding and intent. A land contract is to be viewed as a whole
and in the light of the circumstances surrounding
its execution, with a view to determining the intention of the parties. \\There it consists of or is
evidenced by several connected instruments constituting one entire transaction, they must be
construed together as a whole, and not as separate, independent purchases or transactions."
It is also evident from the following section in
Am. J ur. (Sec. 98) that parol evidence may be used
to establish any fact that does not vary, alter or contradict the terms of the instrument or the legal effect of
the terms used therein. The court may take into consideration conditions and circumstances under which
the parties contracted and construed the contract in the
light thereof. See 36 LRA (NS) 313.
Only by the aid of parol evidence can the court
ascertain the circumstances under which a contract was
made, the relation of the parties, and what was their
mutual knowledge. See 55 ALR·ll53.
We respectfully submit that there were many
things discussed and apparently agreed upon between
these parties and the same was then placed in writing,
but in the language and terrninology of the respondents'
choosing. How else can a determination be made of what
the respective parties considered that language to mean,
without hearing testimony of each of them as to what
was discussed and why that provision went into the
contract.
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4. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED

IN REFUSING TO ALLOW EVIDENCE
CONCERNING PARTIES' INTENTION AS
TO USE OF THE WORDS, "OR MORE,"
IN SAID CONTRACTS AND IN MAI{ING
A FINDING AND DECREE THEREON AS
A MATTER OF LAW.
We respectfully submit that testimony and evidence should be had to determine intent of parties
with respect to use of the words, "or more," in the
contracts. Same legal principles apply as in Point No.3,
but this one is so important it merits separate consideration.
We admit that in most cases this language is put
in to give the buyer the right to pay more if he wants
to, but in this instance it was put in to explain and
justify to seller that more would be paid and so explained to him by Rubey. We respectfully submit that
the words, "or more" are not limited to benefits and
rights for Rubey alone.
5. THAT
THE
DISTRICT
COURT
ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT A
JURY TRIAL 'VITH RESPECT TO FURTHER HEARINGS OR EVIDENCE CONCERNING DISPUTED FACTS, AND INTENTION OF THE PARTIES, AND THIS
ERROR WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE
SEVENTH Al\IENDl\:IENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
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The Constitution of the United States, the Utah
State Constitution and our Rules of Civil Procedure
all direct that a jury trial shall be had upon demand
of any party, unless it is an equity proceeding or some
other situation where a jury trial is not appropriate.
Attention is respectfully directed to Holland vs.
Wilson, a Utah case decided July 8, 1958, found at
327 Pac. 2d 250. In this case, the court stated as foliows:
"We are of the opinion that where the question
is presented as to the right to possession, the
right to a jury trial is guaranteed. Only by such
a construction can the section be liberally construed to effect what we believe were the objects
and intent of the same."
6. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN DENYING APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT THE APPELLANTS BE ALLOWED INTEREST AT THE LEGAL RATE
ON THE CONTRACT BALANCES.
The law has long been settled in Utah that interest is allowed on debts overdue, even in absence of
statute or contract providing therefor. See Wasatch
Mining Co. vs. Crescent Mining Co., 7 Utah 8, 24 Pacific
586. Affirmed 151 U.S. 317, 14 S. Ct. 348.
There is no provision in the contracts between these
parties for forbearance of interest, and as such under
custom and law interest should be allowed. Or, if there
is a question about interest, then evidence should have
been taken to determine the intention of the parties
as to interest.
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THAT
THE
DISTRICT
COURT
ERRED IN DIS~1ISSING CIVIL CASE NO.
139263 AFTER IT WAS CONSOLIDATED
AND
WITHOUT
THE
APPELLANTS
BEING
GIVEN
THEIR
STATUTORY
RIGHT TO AMENDMENT. THAT THE
COURT ALSO ERRED IN DENYING THE
CONSOLIDATION OF CIVIL CASE NOS.
124832, 139046 and 139263.
7.

Appellants in this matter, filed a separate action
identified as Case No. 139263 in the District Court of
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and the same asking
for a declaratory relief with respect to the agreements
between these parties. The District Court granted the
motion for consolidation and then immediately dismissed
the same, and the same was dismissed without appellants
being given their statutory right to amendment. It was
also error for the trial court to assume jurisdiction of a
motion to dismiss a new case, as this matter should
have gone before the regular law and motion court for
disposition. That the District Court also erred in denying consolidation and hearing of Civil Case Nos. 124832,
139046 and 139263 as they all arise and flow from the
contracts between these parties and are all based upon
the interpretation of the said agreements, and damages
or rights that flow from the same.
8. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING THE CLERK OF THE COlTRT
TO MAKE AND DELIY.ER A
ARRANTY

''r

14
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

D
B.

(]

l(

m
((

au:

-,

<J

:~t

l'r

DEED TO THE RESPONDENTS AND AS
SET OUT IN THE DECREE OF NOVEMBER 28, 1962.
9. THAT IT WAS ERROR FOR THE
CLERK TO PAY ATTORNEYS FEES AND
COSTS OUT OF THE DEPOSIT THAT HAD
BEEN MADE TO THE CLERK OF THE
COURT.
We respectfully submit that the District Court
did not have the authority nor the right to direct the
Clerk of the Court to issue a Warranty Deed for the
appellants as this deprived the appellants of their property without due process of law, was an exercise of
authority not extended to District Court Judges and
was made in violation of third party rights who had
proper liens against the property in question. We submit that the court may have had the authority to issue
a decree in which it would be adjudged and decreed that
certain property was then the property of respondents,
but we respectfully submit that the District Court did
not have the authority nor the right to have the Clerk
of the Court sign a Warranty Deed for and on behalf
of these appellants.
It is respectfully submitted that the District Judge
did not have the authority to act as he did and order
the clerk to issue a warranty deed for the appellants.
Under the provisions of 78-7-18, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the court has powers conferred by law, and
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these powers do not extend to cover the present act of
the district court in ordering the execution of a deed.
The general rule requires a judge to exercise his
judicial authority in person without delegation to another. The jurisdiction and powers of a judge extend
and are limited to those fixed by law. Beyond that he
cannot act; nor is he required to do so. See Vol. 48,
Corpis Juris Secundum, at page 1008.
10. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO
GRANT ATTORNEYS' FEES TO RESPONDENTS BASED ON THE ACCOUNT OF THEIR
ATTORNEYS.

The court herein made an award of attorneys' fees
to respondents based upon counsel's statement of account. We respectfully urge this was error for the
following reasons:
(a) Any award of attorneys' fes was premature
until this present appeal was settled.
(b) Attorneys' fees should be awarded upon reasonable basis and not upon an attorney's account rendered to respondent. On respondent's first motion for
attorneys' fees the same was denied but allowance given
to amend because counsel had attempted to re-evaluate
attorneys' fees previously awarded. Then on hearing,
the entire amount was allowed as petitioned, but this
covered only attorneys' fees from the last time award
was made.
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(c) If we 1nade a strict construction against respondents, then no attorneys' fees should be allowed as
contract does not mention attorney, but refers to "attroney.''

CONCLUSION
V\Te respectfully submit that the two or more judgments and decrees entered by the district court should
be reversed, and that this matter should be remanded
with instructions to the lower court to take evidence
and hear testimony with respect to the disputed points
of the contracts involved, that the district court be
ordered to construe the contracts strictly against the
respondents; that direction be given to hear particularly
evidence concerning the meaning of the words "or
n1ore"; that should the matter be remanded for hearing
that all three actions be consolidated for trial and that
trial be had by jury.

D. EUGENE LIVINGSTON and
WILLIAM J. CAYIAS
405 Continental Bank Bldg.

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for .Appellants
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